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Labor Law-Superseniority for Union Stewards Held a Violation
of the National Labor Relations Act
Employee seniority has been recognized by Congress and the
courts as a legitimate part of the industrial structure,1 despite its well-
publicized abuses. 2 A variation of the practice, commonly labelled
superseniority, involves granting additional credits or top seniority to
selected employees. When used in an unarbitrary, nondiscriminatory
manner and as part of a legitimate employment arrangement, super-
seniority has been held to be a valid employment practice.s In NLRB v.
Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338 (Dairylea)4 the applica-
tion of superseniority to a selected union representative was found
to have unlawfully encouraged union membership and thus violated the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act).5 Theoretically, the analysis
and rationale of Dairylea could be applied to preclude any job-related
benefit granted to union representatives by an employer in the absence
of business justifications. Employers6 and labor organizations, 7 how-
ever, can minimize the impact of Dairylea with careful drafting of col-
lective bargaining provisions and a modicum of recordkeeping to loosen
the unlawful linkage between union membership and job benefits.
1. See, e.g., Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521,
526 (1949). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1970); 50 U.S.C. app. § 459 (1970).
Seniority is regularly defined as the length of service that determines the relative equi-
ties and claims to jobs and prerogatives related to employment. For a discussion of
seniority, see Poplin,*Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem,
23 U.C.L.A. L. RFv. 177, 196-99 (1975).
2. For attacks on employee seniority under the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970), see Barton Brands Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th
Cir. 1976); Monolith Portland Cement Co., 94N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951). For cases
arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified
in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.), see Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
3. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
4. 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976). The case is popularly known as Dairylea,
after the charged employer that did not appeal the Board's decision in 219 N.L.R.B.
-, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1975).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970). 531 F.2d at.1166.
6. Section 2(2) of the Act defines an employer to include "any person acting
as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
7. Section 2(5) of the Act defines labor organizations as follows:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, iii which employ-
ees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates .of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
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In December, 1972, a highly profitable milk delivery route became
vacant in the plant of Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. (the Employer).
Rosengrandt, a union steward,, and Daniels, an employee with twenty-
four more years of service with the Employer than Rosengrandt, both
applied for the job. The Employer was required by a collective bar-
gaining agreement" to assign the job to the applicant with the greatest
seniority. Since another provision of the contract designated the stew-
ard the "Senior Employee," the Employer awarded the job to Rosen-
grandt.
A charge was filed and a complaint issued by the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) against the Employer and Local 3389 al-
leging unlawful encouragement of union membership in violation of sec-
tions 8(a)(1), 10 8(a)(3), 11 8(b)(1)(A), 12 and 8(b)(2) 8 of the Act re-
sulting from the maintenance and enforcement of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The parties waived an evidentiary hearing and sub-
mitted the case on stipulations directly to the Board. The Board, how-
ever, refused to accept the stipulations and remanded the case for an evi-
dentiary hearing before an administrative law judge to determine the pur-
pose behind, operation of and justification for the superseniority clause.14
8. The contract provision in question was also contained in collective bargaining
agreements with Local 338 and seven other employers. The Employer and Local 338
had originally entered into a contract with this provision in 1937. The contract also
contained a valid union security clause. 531 F.2d at 1164-65.
The agreement provided that the union steward be selected by Local 338 from
the employees at the plant location and that "'t]he steward shall be considered the
Senibr employee in the craft in which he is employed."' Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219
N.L.R.B. -, -, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1737 (1975). The parties conceded that this
clause gave a steward top seniority with respect to layoff and recall and such contrac-
tual benefits as assignment of overtime, selection of vacation period and assignment
of driver routes and other positions. 531 F.2d at 1164.
9. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local 338, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. 531 F.2d at 1162.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). This section states that "[ilt shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 [section 157 of the Code] . .. ."
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). This section states in relevant part that
"[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- . . . (3) by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. .. ."
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). This section states in part that "[it
shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 [section 157 of
the Code] . . "
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970). This section states in relevant part that
"[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of
subsection (a) (3) . . "
14. "The purpose of the remand.. .was, inter alia, to accord Respondent Union
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Once again, the parties waived a hearing, stipulating that no evidence
was available regarding the intent of the framers of the provision and
resubmitted the case to the Board.
The Board en banc found that by maintaining and enforcing the
superseniority clause and awarding the route to the steward instead of
to the otherwise senior employee, the Employer had violated sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act and that Local 338 was guilty of vio-
lations of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2).15 It ordered both to re-
frain from enforcing such clauses in the future and to reimburse Dan-
iels for sustained losses.16 The Board determined that the clause gave
unions a wide range of on-the-job benefits that could only be achieved
by an employee who was a "good, enthusiastic unionist ' 117 and thus il-
legally tied job rights and benefits to union activities. Therefore, the
Board held that superseniority not limited on its face to layoff and re-
call was presumptively unlawful, with the party asserting its legality as-
suming the burden of proof.18
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order,
finding violations of only sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of
the Act.' 9 Recognizing the power of the Board as trier of fact to draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence before it, the court sustained
the conclusion that the disparate treatment accorded stewards and non-
stewards as to on-the-job benefits aside from layoff and recall resulted
in unlawful encouragement of union membership. Such activity fell
within the prohibition of section 8(a)(3) whose scope encompasses
not only actual discrimination that induces workers to join a union, but
also conduct that encourages employees to become enthusiastic union
members or merely to decide to support it, assist it or participate in
or any of the other parties a full opportunity to establish a proper justification for
the super seniority clauses here under attack." Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B.
-,-89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1739 n.9 (1975).
15. Id. at -, 89 LR.R.M. at 1740. See notes 10-13 supra for the relevant text
of these sections.
16. 219 N.L.R.B. at-, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1739.
17. Id. at -, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1738.
18. Id. at -, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1739. Member Fanning dissented and would-have
dismissed the complaint on the basis of Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Camp-
bell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949). He stated that the provision did encourage union stew-
ardship, but he equated that with encouraging a public service. He believed that the
general counsel had not met his burden of proof since the evidence in the case did
not show that stewards were selected on any basis other than ability. Dairylea Coop.,
Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, -, 89 LR.R.M. 1737, 1741 (1975).
19. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1165
& n.3 (2d Cir. 1976).
291
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
its activities. 2° Noting the failure of Local 338 to present legitimate and.
substantial business justifications for superseniority, 2' the Second Cir-
cuit rejected the union's abandoned claim that these provisions encour-
age the service of qualified persons and suggested that alternatives to
superseniority in the form of a union-paid salary or other non-job bene-
fits be used to recruit able stewards.22
The launching point for cases arising under the Act is section 7,
the heart of the Act, which recognizes the right of employees to "form,
join, or assist labor organizations, . . . [or] refrain from any or all
of such activities . ... "2 It is an unfair labor practice for an employer
or labor organization to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
of their section 7 rights to engage or not to engage in concerted activi-
ties. 4
A provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement is not
sacrosanct simply because it has been included in the contract. If it
concerns a condition of employment, such as seniority, it is required
to conform to the provisions of the.Act. 5
In Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,26 the Supreme Court heard
three cases dealing with the issue of unlawful encouragement of union
activity. In the first instance, the union had caused an employer to
reduce an employee's seniority for delinquency in paying dues. In the
second, the union had suspended an employee for "bumping" a fellow
employee and taking a job without its clearance. The third case in-
volved an employer who granted retroactive wage increases and vacation
payments solely to members of the union. Finding violations of the
Act in all three cases, the Supreme Court recognized that "[ult is
common experience that the desire of employees to unionize is raised
or lowered by the advantages thought to be attained by such action.
Moreover, the Act does not require that the employees discriminated
against be the ones encouraged for purposes of violations of § 8(a)
(3)."'27 The Court further observed that no specific proof of unlawful
intent need be shown so long as the natural and foreseeable conse-
20. Id. at 1165; see Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42 (1954).
21. 531 F.2d at 1166 (citing NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26,
34 (1967)).
22. 531 F.2d at 1166.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
24. Id. §§ 158(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
25. E.g., United Steelworkers Local 1070, 171 N.L.R.B. 945, 946 (1968).
26. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
27. Id. at 51.
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quences of discriminatory conduct serve to encourage or discourage
union membership.2
In Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB,2"
the Supreme Court limited Radio Officers' by rejecting the Board's con-
tention that union hiring halls were per 5e unlawful. Although the very
existence of hiring halls might encourage union membership, the Court
determined that the Act was intended to ban only specific encourage-
ment brought about by discrimination and not the encouragement of-
fered by a negotiated plan that was nondiscriminatory on its face.80
Thereafter, in cases applying Radio Officers' as modified by Local
357, it was held that the insistence of a union that an employer reduce
the seniority of an employee-union member because he had been de-
linquent in paying his dues unlawfully strengthened the union's control
of its members and encouraged nonmembers to join, in violation of sec-
tions 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2).11 In other cases; the union's insistence that
the employer discharge all of its employees and hire new ones through the
union's hiring hall as a precondition to signing a contract 2 and the re-
fusal to refer a member33 were found to be violations of the Act be-
cause they involved the union's influence over employees and its power
to affect their livelihood. Such influence, in the absence of any union
contention that its actions were necessary to represent its members ef-
fectively violated the Act. 4
Local 357 indicated that not all encouragement of union member-
ship constitutes a violation of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2).85 Fur-
thermore, in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,"' the Supreme Court's
holding indicated that presumptive invalidity or unlawfulness under the
Act could be rebutted with evidence of a legitimate and substantial
28. Id. at 45; see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1944).
29. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
30. Id. at 675-76.
31. E.g., Seafarers Int'l Union, 202 N.L.R.B. 657, 659 n.13 (1973), enforced,
496 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1974).
32. Austin & Wolfe Refrig., Air Cond. & Heating, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 135 (1973).
Local 357 did not sanction this use of hiring halls.
33. Local 1437, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 210 N.L.R.B. 359 (1974) (other em-
ployees' perception of the union's arbitrary exercise of power necessarily encouraged
their union membership).
34. Operating Eng'rs Local 18, 204 N.L.R.B. 681 (1973), remanded per curiam,
496 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd on rehearing, 90 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1975) (mem-
bers' failure to pay a fine imposed for disrupting a hiring hall and internal election
did not justify removal from seniority list).
35. 365 U.S. at 675-76.
36. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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business justification in the absence of unlawful intent.87 In Great
Dane the Court held that the actions of an employer who had refused
to pay accrued vacation benefits to striking employees under a'termin-
ated collective bargaining agreement while paying them to replacement
workers, returning strikers and nonstrikers violated section 8(a)(3). 88
Great Dane is equally applicable to a situation that involves violations
of both sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2). It merely restates the Board's
earlier policy of accepting union "interference" with the employment
relationship, if the union had a business or collective bargaining pur-
pose for all represented employees.8 9
On the authority of Great Dane, the Supreme Court recognized
the union's traditional function of serving the economic interests of the
bargaining unit as a whole and upheld a union fine levelled against a
member who had exceeded a piecework ceiling."' Similarly, in an-
other case, the Board found that the need for a union to perform its
tasks more effectively for the benefit of all permitted an employer to
compensate union members for time spent on union work.41
The Second Circuit's insistence that unions reward prospective
stewards with only non-job incentives leaves the door open for future
attacks on superseniority clauses that are in any manner job-related.
The seniority concept, 2 recognized by Congress,4  is a legitimate
union interest that ought not hastily be deemed discriminatory. Not
even clauses that offer stewards protection from layoff, however, are
immune from attack on the basis of Dairylea. But these clauses have
a justifiable use.4" As a term or condition of employment, seniority
37. Id. at 27. Prior to Great Dane, the Board had upheld a union's solicitation
of the discharge of an employee who had refused a night job in violation of the
contract. Houston Typographical Union No. 87, 145 N.LR.B. 1657 (1964). It also
upheld the fine of a union member who had not accepted a contractual subsistence
allowance. Millwrights' Local 1102, 144 N.L.RLB. 798 (1964).
38. 388 U.S. at 27.
39. Austin & Wolfe Refrig., Air Cond. & Heating, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 135, 137
(1973) (Miller, Chairman, dissenting).
40. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 431-36 (1969).
41. Sunnen Prod., Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 826 (1971); see IBEW Local 592, 92
L.R.R.M. 1159 (1976) (union refused to refer member who had not passed union-
administered test); International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 68, 205 N.L.R.B. 132'
(1973), vacated, 503 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1975) (union reduced seniority standing
of employee on extended leave of absence); Millwright Local 1080, 201 N.L.R.B. 882
(1973) (union refused to refer self-employed member).
42. See note I supra.
43. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 339-41 (1953); Aeronautical
Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 527 (1949).
44. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 528 (1949);
accord, Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, -, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1738 (1973).
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is tailored to each shop and it is only reasonable to assume that varia-
tions in seniority practices will develop in individual plants.45 The
union, meanwhile, has a duty of fair representation of all unit employ-
ees. 4  It also has the obligation to see that the contract is preserved
as part of the continuous collective bargaining process.
47
In order to preserve its vitality, the union- needs continuity of its
officials within their jobs. Without the assurance that its elected repre-
sentatives will be present. to maintain the collective .bargaining agree-
ment as a living document and to see that grievances are promptly and
properly adjusted at their source,4 8 the union loses legitimacy in the
eyes of the employer and the support of employees who question the
validity of their representation. The Supreme Court recognized the
validity of this union interest in Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge
727 v. Campbell49 and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman5" and allowed spe-
cific superseniority for union chairmen and stewards despite a provision
of the Selective Service Act that mandated restoration of seniority for
returning veterans -of World War l1.51 While neither of these cases
arose under the Act, the Board has sanctioned seniority variations in
other cases, including "superseniority". for stewards as an exercise of
a union's discretion.
52
45. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. "330, 337-38 (1953).
46. Id. at 337; see Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944).
See also IATSE Local 659, 197 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1972), enforced per curiam, 83
L.R.R.M. 2527 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, enfbrcemeht
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
47. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 528 (1949).
48. See id. at 527.
49. 337 U.S. 521, 528 (1949); see text accompanying notes 1, 43 & 44 supra.
50. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
51. Id. at 342; Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. at
529 (1949). The Act provided:
SEc. 8....
(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such
training and service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary
position, in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate
[of satisfactory completion of his period of training and service], (2) is still
qualified to perform the duties of such position, and (3) makes application
for reemployment within forty days after he is relieved from such training
and service-
(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such
employer shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like
seniority, status and pay unless the employer's circumstances have so changed
as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; ....
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 8, 54 Stat. 890 (current version
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 459(b) (1970)).
52. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1500, 1503 (1962), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963). See generally Barton Brands
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Although Ford and Campbell involved limited exceptions to plant-
wide seniority rules for the limited purpose of protection against layoff
and are therefore distinguishable from the more general clauses seen
in Dairylea, their absence from the Second Circuit's consideration can
be read to put into question the concept of limited superseniority for
union stewards. Provision of employment is the foremost job-related
benefit. Protection against layoff and the right of first recall are essen-
tial to maintain the steward's representation of the bargaining unit.
The Second Circuit implied that non-job benefits and union-paid
salaries to attract qualified stewards constitute the only permissible al-
ternatives not violative of the Act.5 The suggestion that the union pay
its stewards a salary in lieu of contractual benefits may prove to be un-
realistic. Smaller locals are often financially pressed and the burden
of paying stewards could possibly bankrupt them. In larger employ-
ment situations, the sheer number of stewards and the cost of a union
salary for each of these workers could be prohibitive. On the other
hand, the employer, with greater resources and control over terms and
conditions of employment, receives benefits from the service of union
stewards. 5" It would be more in keeping with the purpose of the Act
to maintain industrial stability55 to allow employees and labor organiza-
tions to devise their own ways of rewarding stewards, since in theory,
at least, stewards aid both parties.56
Ltd., 213 N.LR.B. 640, 645 (1974) (Jenkins dissenting); Campbell Sixty Six Express,
Inc., 200 N.LR.B. 1126 (1972); Wanzer Dairy Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 782 (1965); Ar-
mored Car Chauffeurs & Guards Local 820, 145 N.L.R.B. 225 (1963); Florida Power
& Light Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 967 (1960); Armour & Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1157 (1959).
53. 531 F.2d at 1166.
54. These employees, commonly labelled grievance chairmen or shop stewards,
provide a service to the bargaining unit, as well as to the employer and to the up-
holding of national labor policies, by promoting industrial stability and certainty and
the speedy resolution of disputes that might otherwise cause work delays. Therefore,
for them, superseniority should not be denied. See Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge
727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 528-29 n.5 (1949).
55. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf.Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
56. In Dairylea, the collective bargaining agreement contained a lawful union-
security clause that required all employees, after a period of time, to become union
members. There still exists, however, the possibility in situations without such a clause
that there may be senior non-union employees who will suffer in comparison to "super-
senior" stewards. In those instances, the argument can be made that even the presence
of superseniority for union stewards limited to layoff and recall is violative of the
Act since it would discriminate against non-union employees.
This disingenuous argument is appealing, no doubt, but in balance, superseniority
would still prevail. The damage to the interests of employees who exercise their statu-
torily protected right to refrain from union membership is outweighed by the benefits
to the unit, the employer and the national eoonomy provided by collective bargaining
that were recognized initially by the framers of the National Labor Relations Act
296 [Vol. 55
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Employers and labor organizations should again note that Local
338 "was accorded ample opportunity to introduce evidence of its stew-
ard selection policies to rebut the Board's conclusion '57 of presump-
tive invalidity of the contract clause but waived opportunities for evi-
dentiary hearings. On appeal, it asserted its collective bargaining
agreement as the sole justification for the superseniority clause and pre-
sented no evidence of any other legitimate or substantial business rea-
son.58  Thus, the Second Circuit merely enforced an order based on
prima facie violations of the Act.59
In the face of the Board's persistent refusal to exercise its rule-
making powers, 60 the application of Dairylea and with it, the fate of
superseniority, will rest largely in the hands of the Board's general coun-
sel. He is given the statutory authority to decide whether to issue a com-
plaint following the filing of each charge with the Board.61 In unionized
industries, seniority is most likely to be a deeply ingrained practice, so
• that when employer and union representatives sit down to negotiate or
renegotiate an agreement, they should be mindful of the general coun-
sel's interpretation of superseniority in order to diminish the likelihood
of costly future proceedings. This vigilance in adjusting superseniority
clauses should insulate them from future attack by the Board.
Thus, the practical impact of Dairylea is greatest at the contract
negotiation level.62 The parties will seek to have seniority arrange-
ments conform to the bounds of the law, with the slightest possible dis-
ruption of established practices. In drafting a superseniority clause the
parties will have to stay within two basic strictures. First, a nexus be-
tween collective bargaining and the employee receiving the rewards
and the courts for 40 years thereafter. If the benefit afforded stewards is necessary
for the proper carrying out of their responsibilities as stewards, which in turn is neces-
sary in the application of the collective bargaining agreements, then this countervailing
consideration should prevail.
57. 531 F.2dat 1166.
58. See generally text accompanying note 25 supra.
59. 531 F.2d at 1167.
60. The Board has continuously refrained from exercising its rulemaking powers
under section 6 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970). See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970). This section provides that the general counsel
"shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation
of charges and issuance of complaints under section 160, and in respect of the prose-
cution of such complaints before the Board .... "
62. If the Supreme Court hears Dairylea, its standard of review may be limited
to whether or not the Board could reasonably have inferred that the superseniority
clause spurred workers to become good unionists and was thus a violation of the Act.
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should initially be established. While Campbell spoke of a "benefit
to the whole Union,"63 decisions under the Act emphasize that a labor
organization, as the representative of all employees, union and non-
union, must make its benefits available to every member of the bargain-
ing unit. 4  The employee favorably affected by additional seniority
must be in a position to aid the entire unit. Such employees include
primarily officials who see that grievances are promptly heard and ad-
justed, or those who have the duty to see that the collective bargaihing
agreement is upheld. These individuals provide services to both the
bargaining unit and the employer as well as promote national labor
policies. Therefore, superseniority for them should not be denied.00
To withstand attack, the benefits that are provided appropriate
officials must also be limited in scope. Top seniority for all benefits
connected to the job cannot be upheld in most instances since it at-
taches union membership to the terms and conditions of employment
in too forceful a manner."6 In the extraordinary instance where it can
be documented that superseniority for unlimited purposes is the only
means available to attract qualified personnel, and then, only after re-
peated failure with other inducements, the Board will probably give its
approval to the arrangement. 7  Despite the Second Circuit's oblique
reference to layoff and recall provisions, it must be noted that the gen-
eral counsel and Board share the position that such limited supersen-
iority for similar purposes is not contrary to the policies of the Act."'
Thirty years of precedent appear to support that proposition and it
would unfairly disrupt most industrial settings to rule now that this bene-
fit violates the Act."9
If charges are filed, the burden on employers and unions to justify
superseniority is not heavy. A minimum of notes and records need
63. 337 U.S. at 527 (emphasis added).
64. E.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 47 (1954).
65. See Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1975).
Union officials who do not administer the collective bargaining agreement and those
who take part in contract negotiations only at specified intervals will be harder to
justify as integral links to the unit. Id. at -, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1738.
66. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42 (1954).
67. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, _, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1738 (1975)
(dictum).
68. Compare id. with NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531
F.2d 1162, 1166 n.7 (1976). Both the general counsel and the Board appear to agree
that protection from layoff is justified in a unioa's need for continuity in order to
provide substantive representation to all unit employees.
69. Dairylea Coop, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, -, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1738 n.6 (1975)
(citing the "relevance of the Court's reasoning" in Campbell).
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to be kept to provide the basis to document a Great Dane justification.
The Board has flexibly examined asserted union justifications in prior
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) cases and so long as the union's reasons for
a superseniority clause are not to avoid or circumvent -the impact of
another statute70 or are not based on suspect classifications such as al-
ienage,71 race 7 2 or union membership,7 3 they should suffice, if properly
documented.'
In Dairylea, the Second Circuit held that superseniority clauses for
union stewards that apply for unlimited purposes on the job fly in the
face of the policy of section 7 of the Act by tying employment benefits
to union activity and unlawfully encouraging union membership. The
decision involved, however, the unlikely prospect of a union that did
not assert any justification for its questioned superseniority clause. If
it had asserted that such a clause was necessary to enable it to represent
the bargaining unit better, the union would have stood a greater chance
of succeeding. The lack of justification for the contractual provision
allowed the Second Circuit not only to declare it presumptively unlaw-
ful, but also impliedly to threaten even the limited application of super-
seniority to any union representative. This threat, however, is dimin-
ished by the.court's failure to deal with prior cases that had sanctioned
a limited use of superseniority. This limitation, coupled with the rel-
ative ease with which the court's presumption can be rebutted, and
buttressed by the practicalities of the Act's enforcement, may mean that
Dairylea will provide little, if any, threat to traditional industrial prac-
tices.
HowARD MARK KASTRINSKY
70. Austin & Wolfe Refrig., Air Cond. & Heating, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 135 (1973);
American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
71. NLRB v. Local 1581, ILA, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1040 (1974), enforcing 196 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1972).
72. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); NLRB v. Local 1367,
ILA, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Local 12,
United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
73. See Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Local 631, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 213 N.L.R.B. 600 (1974); Boiler-
makers Local 169, 209 N.L.R.B. 140 (1974); Local 167, Progressive Mine Workers,
173 N.L.R.B. 1237, enforced, 422 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Local 17, ILA, 173 N.L.R.B. 594, enforced per curiam, 434 F.2d 620 (9th
Cir. 1970); Local 383, Lathers, 176 N.L.R.B. 410 (1969).
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